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PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS:
A VIEW OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S
RESPONSIBILITY
David G. Bress*M oRE than thirty years ago, in Berger v. United States,' Mr.
Justice Sutherland described the heavy and multiple respon-
sibility assumed by a prosecutor. The. United States Attorney, he
asserted, not only must be an advocate for the prosecution, but also
must ensure that justice prevails. The Justice stated: "It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.' 2
In the face of this admonition and the standard of conduct
required of the prosecutor, one is prone to inquire about the respon-
sibilities of the defense counsel. Is he merely an advocate for his
client under all circumstances, or is he also governed by a standard
of conduct which imposes both a duty to the courts and restrictions
upon his conduct in dealings with his client? It would appear that
the views expressed by Professor Freedman imply the 'former-that
the duty of defense counsel to secure an acquittal for his client is
paramount to his obligation to the court and to the legal profession.
It is submitted that Professor Freedman's views are contrary to the
Canons of Professional Ethics,3 notwithstanding his suggestion that
his position must be adopted if the confidentiality of lawyer-client
communications is to be preserved.
There can be no question that the recent procedural and sub-
stantive developments in criminal law have defined and extended
the rights of persons accused of crime. Some 'of the decisions effect-
ing these developments were long overdue and reflect changing
concepts of due process. It is the duty of the advocate to be thor-
oughly familiar with these innovations and with the advantages
afforded by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including the
new discovery techniques introduced in the recent amendments to
the Rules." These developments, coupled with the recent growth of
public or quasi-public defender offices, whose investigative staffs
have been made readily available to counsel appointed to represent
* United States Attorney for the District of Columbia-Ed.
1. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
2. Id. at 88.
3. AzEmicAN BAR AssoCrATnON. CANONS OF PROMssIONAL ETmICS (1908).
4. See rmn. R. Cnsm. P. 16(b), as amended Feb. 28, 1966, to take effect July 1, 1966.
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indigents, have presented defense counsel both with new methods of
defense and with increased responsibilities to his client. Counsel's
duties to the court and to the profession, however, have not changed.
A defense attorney does not promote the attainment of justice
when he secures his client's freedom through illegal or improper
means. Rather, by the use of such methods, he breaches the public
trust reposed in him by virtue of his oath of office. Canon 5, entitled
"The Defense or Prosecution of Those Accused of Crime," provides:
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person
accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the
guilt of the accused . . . Having undertaken such defense,
the lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to pre-
sent every defense that the law of the land permits, to the end
that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due
process of law.5
Canon 5 thus sets a standard of conduct for defense counsel
which restricts him to the use of "fair and honorable means." Like
the prosecutor, counsel for the defense must remain within the
bounds of propriety. When the prosecutor is regarded as "the servant
of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape
or innocence suffer,"8 is it appropriate that the defense attorney be
allowed to use unfair methods in protecting his client? Do the dic-
tates of justice or of our system of jurisprudence require that he be
permitted to do so? It would appear that neither the presumption
of the defendant's innocence nor the government's burden of proof
demands that the defense attorney act with anything other than
honor and fairness.
With specific reference to the problems posed by Professor Freed-
man in his article, it is agreed that, absent some unusual circum-
stances, every witness presented by one's adversary should be
subjected to searching cross-examination. 7 Once a defendant has ex-
ercised his constitutional right to put the government to its proof, the
question of his guilt or innocence is to be determined by the trier
of fact. Accordingly, the advocate should not rely on his own opin-
ion of the witness' veracity, but rather must present to the jury all of
the factors relevant to the witness' perceptual ability, his bias, and
the consistency of his testimony.8
5. Emphasis added.
6. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
7. See Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MicHI. L. Rv. 1469 (1966).
8. See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
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With respect to Professor Freedman's second proposition,9 it is
interesting to note that the broadly-phrased question whether a law-
yer should present a witness who he knows will commit perjury re-
mains unanswered. He advocates only the less startling, but never-
theless perplexing, proposition that an attorney should permit his
client to perjure himself. It is inconceivable that ethical counsel
would call to the witness stand a person, other than his own client,
who he knows will commit perjury. Professor Freedman does not
undertake to defend such a tactic. Clearly, the prosecutor may not
call such a witness;' 0 counsel for the defense ought not be allowed
to do so either. Judge Warren E. Burger of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has stated:
It must be remembered that there is not a dual standard of
conduct, one for the prosecutor and one for the defense coun-
sel. Nor is there a different standard of professional duty as
between paid or unpaid counsel. The fact that improper con-
duct of a prosecutor is more readily dealt with by reversal of
convictions should not lead defense counsel to believe that such
conduct goes unnoticed by this court."1
As previously noted, the Canons of Professional Ethics emphasize
that a lawyer may use only "fair and honorable" means in defense
of a client.12 They also provide that counsel must not take part in
any fraud,' 3 and that, should perjury occur in a trial, he owes a duty
"to the profession and to the public to bring the matter to the knowl-
edge of the prosecuting authorities." 4 Under no reasonable inter-
pretation can the attorney-client privilege justify using perjured tes-
timony of a non-client.15
Admittedly, a more difficult question is presented when one's
client insists upon testifying falsely in his own behalf. Surely, coun-
sel must vigorously attempt to dissuade the client from this course
of action. If his efforts fail, counsel should move to withdraw from
the case.10 Under such circumstances, counsel need not divulge his
9. See Freedman, supra note 7, at 1469.
10. E.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).




15. See notes 18-20 infra.
16. See Canons 15 ("The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it de-
mand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane. He
must obey his conscience and not that of his client.'); 16 ("If a client persists in such
wrongdoing, the lawyer should terminate their relation.'); 44 ("If the client insists
upon an . . . immoral course in the conduct of his case, ... the lawyer may be
warranted in withdrawing on due notice to the client . ..
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client's confidences, for the court might well accept his assertion that
he could no longer conscientiously represent the defendant. While
a majority of lawyers appear to agree that an attorney should attempt
to withdraw in such a situation,17 Professor Freedman finds fault
with this procedure because he fears that the defendant, anticipating
an attorney's probable reaction to the truth, will merely lie initially
to his next attorney. This, however, would not be as great a misfor-
tune as Professor Freedman implies. The defendant would have been
advised by his first lawyer of the strong possibility that the prosecu-
tor will expose his perjured defense, thus seriously jeopardizing his
chance for acquittal by calling his credibility into question before
the jury.
Moreover, conscientious counsel would have reminded his client
that perjury is illegal and might result in his being cited for con-
tempt of court,18 that counsel could be prosecuted for criminal com-
plicity,19 and that an intention to commit perjury destroys the attor-
ney-client privilege.20 In the face of such advice, the unscrupulous
defendant would have been afforded the opportunity to make an
intelligent and considered judgment before committing perjury.
While the second lawyer's defense efforts would be handicapped by
his ignorance of the truth, the defendant himself would have elected
this course deliberately. Thus, the onus for the perjury would not
rest upon a member of the bar, but rather upon the defendant alone.
Of course, should the motion for leave to withdraw be denied,
counsel must continue in the case. If the defendant persists in his
decision to perjure himself, then the lawyer must, unfortunately,
permit, him to testify. In this event, however, counsel will have ful-
filled his moral obligations to the court and will have maintained
his client's confidences, as well as his client's respect. 21
Logic and reason alone are sufficient to compel disagreement
with Professor Freedman's third proposition-that a defendant
should be given the opportunity to fabricate a defense by being in-
formed of the legal consequences before being asked his version of
the facts. In addition, however, Canon 15 specifically states that only
17. See, e.g., Steinberg, The Defense of the White Collar Accused: An Attorney's
View, 3 Ar. CRUm. L.Q. 129, 132 (1965).
18. See United States v. Arbuckle, 48 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1943). See also Ex parte
Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 384 (1919); In re Gottman, 118 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1941).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964) proscribes no less.
20. Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353 (1891); In re Sawyer's Petition, 229
F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1956). See also Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement respecting destruction
of the privilege, even in the absence of pari delicto. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S.
1, 15 (1933).
21. Cf. Canon 31.
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the "unscrupulous" contend that "it is the duty of the lawyer to do
whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause."
Although Professor Freedman purports to shift to the defendant the
moral responsibility for what may become perjured testimony,22
counsel cannot so easily escape culpability in a dear case of subor-
nation of perjury.
Significantly, Canon 22 states that "it is unprofessional and dis-
honorable to deal other than candidly with the facts in taking the
statements of witnesses . . . ." Furthermore, Professor Freedman's
proposition is contrary to another principle which he accepts as fun-
damental to the attorney-client relationship-that of full and free
disclosure. An attorney who adopts the Professor's viewpoint will
never be certain what actually happened.23 He may thereafter build
his entire defense upon a foundation which might be readily under-
mined by the prosecution. Surely this will not benefit his client, nor
will it increase the esteem in which the legal profession is held by
the defendant or the public.
There is no sound basis for the proposition that different stan-
dards of conduct may be applied to the prosecutor and the defense
counsel and that the latter must make no concessions in the attempt
to free his client. Counsel for the defense must certainly fight vigor-
ously, but he must do so within the framework of the prescribed
rules. He owes loyalty to his client, but he cannot be disloyal "to
the law whose ministers we are, " 24 because "the place of justice is a
hallowed place. " 25 Furthermore, a lawyer who condones perjury does
not advance the cause of justice. Whether he is acquitted or con-
victed, an accused who sees his lawyer employ unethical tactics will
emerge from his trial filled with justifiable contempt for the law,
for his own unscrupulous counsel, and perhaps for the entire legal
profession.
26
Advocates, whether prosecutors or defense attorneys, are con-
strained to remember, as the Supreme Court recently stated, that
"the basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth."2T The
22. See Canon 15.
23. See Canon 8.
24. Canon 32.
25. BACON, Of Judicature, in EssAYs (1955).
26. A lawyer "advances the honor of his profession and the best interests of his
client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and
his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law . ...
[A]bove all a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity
to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal
citizen." Canon 32.
27. Tehan v. Shott, 882 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
June 1966] 1497
Michigan Law Review
Court has also proclaimed that perjury "tends to defeat the sole ulti-
mate objective of trial." 28 It should now be axiomatic that justice
must be achieved for society as well as for defendants, that a criminal
trial is not a sporting contest, and that the fair determination of an
individual's guilt and the protection of society are both important
objectives of the criminal law. Consequently, one must reject the
position of those who believe that morality for the defense counsel
is different from morality for the prosecutor. It is wrong to acquit
the guilty through illegal and improper means, 20 just as it is im-
proper to convict a defendant by the use of such tactics. Thus, a
lawyer's conduct should be guided by the following words of a for-
mer Solicitor General of the United States:
In such a profession [as the law] there is no room for fellowship
with the dishonest, the unfaithful, the untrustworthy, or the
unpatriotic, and no useful place for those who are ignorant or
inadequately prepared. It is our duty to the public, to the gov-
ernment, and to our profession to guard jealously professional
standards and ideals, and to see that they are kept high and
clean.30
28. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945).
29. See Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
30. Address by William M. Frierson, 5th Session, Conference on Legal Education,
1922. See 8 A.BA.J. 156 (1922).
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